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This article is a good example of how people struggle with all the evidence pointing to a lack of free will. Nahmias did nothing to support the idea that we are able to make decisions independent of non-conscious, physically-based events. I myself am not completely convinced of determinism, but the idea that we have the capacity "for imagining future courses of action, deliberating about one’s reasons for choosing them, planning one’s actions in light of this deliberation and controlling actions in the face of competing desires" as causally-free agents is simply unsupportable at this time. (And to simply call those activities "free will" without considering the definitions of those words is tautological, a mistake a philosopher should not make). Sure, we can be free in the sense that a stream is free to flow downhill, and that our freedom can be hindered in the way the stream can be dammed. But we are not free in the sense that we are able to make conscious decisions independent of non-conscious influencing mediators.
As a psychotherapist, part of my job is to help clients achieve a greater sense of agency. Just like building muscles by lifting weights, the ability to feel more in charge of one's life can be improved via developing cognitive skills. We can learn skills like mindful introspection and critical thinking just as we can learn math or tennis. These skills do not require free will.
Here is only one way in which we do not have free will. Early in life we form something called internal working models (IWM), which are predictive models regarding events in the world and the nature of relationships. Although new experiences can and do modify these early IWMs, the IWMs significantly mediate how we interpret and respond to events. IWMs are almost entirely non-conscious, and because of that we cannot simply decide to interpret and respond to things independently of them. As such, our conscious decisions are always going to be influenced by processes that we have no direct control over.
Sure, we can think about things, just as the author suggests. But how do we choose what we think about? If I say, "Quick, think of an animal," did you decide what animal to think about, or did one just pop into your mind? If I change it and say, "Think it over and decide on bringing a city to mind", does that change the experiment or did a city again just pop into your mind? Let's say that didn't happen, and instead you thought, "Okay, before I bring a city to mind, let me add a condition...okay, the city of my birth: Houston! There, I made a conscious decision!" Okay, but did you decide on that conditional modifier or did it too just pop into your mind? If we have no true control over the thoughts that come to mind, then we cannot say in any meaningful sense that our will is free.
There are all kinds of things that effect what comes to mind: environment, conceptual context, mood, hormones, fatigue, hunger. This doesn't prevent us from employing critical thinking or techniques designed to bring greater awareness to one's immediate thoughts. But again, those abilities do not imply or require free will.
J. Ash Bowie
jashbowie@gmail.com
To IRASnet <irasnet@biology.wustl.edu>
Nov 15, 2011
Alex's comment: Excellent!
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