Qualia

[Alex]

An aspect of consciousness is qualia, subjective experience.

Qualia are special because nobody has yet found a way to deal with it in science.

A somewhat related problem is that which one is foundational, the physical or the knowledge (which is mental, ie, non-physical) of the physical?


Philosophy of Mind (from Wikipedia)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind

Naturalism and its problems

The thesis of physicalism is that the mind is part of the material (or physical) world. Such a position faces the problem that the mind has certain properties that no other material thing seems to possess. Physicalism must therefore explain how it is possible that these properties can nonetheless emerge from a material thing. The project of providing such an explanation is often referred to as the "naturalization of the mental." Some of the crucial problems that this project attempts to resolve include the existence of qualia and the nature of intentionality.

Neurobiology

The methodological breakthroughs of the neurosciences, in particular the introduction of high-tech neuroimaging procedures, has propelled scientists toward increasingly ambitious research programs: one of the main goals is to describe and comprehend the neural processes which correspond to mental functions (neural correlate).

Computer science

The question about the possible sensitivity (qualia) of computers or robots still remains open. Some computer scientists believe that the specialty of AI can still make new contributions to the resolution of the "mind body problem". They suggest that based on the reciprocal influences between software and hardware that takes place in all computers, it is possible that someday theories can be discovered that help us to understand the reciprocal influences between the human mind and the brain (wetware).


http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V038

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness

[Alex]

Strange Loop
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strange_loop

"In the end, we are self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in mirages that are little miracles of self-reference."
— Douglas Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop, p.363

[Alex]

Will Robots See?
Stanley Klein
http://cornea.berkeley.edu/pubs/75.pdf

[Alex]

Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html

David J. Chalmers
Department of Philosophy
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
[e-mail]

[Published in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger. Imprint Academic, 1995.]

[Alex]

Tom Clark <[e-mail]>
to Iras <[e-mail]>
April 1, 2012

The epiphenomenalist suspicion

Stan writes: "Indeed Ted is correct that there are many definitions of consciousness that are not epiphenomenal. That ambiguity of definition is the reason that I keep using the unambiguous definition of qualia, the subjective aspect of consciousness."
 
Fwiw, I’ve attached notes for a talk I gave recently at Brown on this, “The epiphenomenalist suspicion: why consciousness does and doesn’t matter” which (following Stan) distinguishes between consciousness defined as qualitative, phenomenal experience, and the neural and cognitive processes associated with experience. The latter are obviously not epiphenomenal with respect to behavior, but the former, I argue, aren’t even epiphenomenal in 3rd person explanations of behavior since they don’t appear to science (they aren’t observable). Still, experience obviously matters for us subjectively: no one is an irrealist about pain and pleasure, which is why how we treat each other (and other sentient systems, natural or artificial) matters. Here’s the abstract:
 
I’ll consider the question of the causal role of consciousness and see what the implications might be. The better we understand the brain, the less it seems that we need appeal to anything beyond neural processes to account for behavior. Nothing immaterial seems necessary. This generates worries about freedom, dignity and autonomy. Are we just deterministic mechanisms? And it presents a puzzle about consciousness: why are we conscious? Why did it evolve? What does it do, if anything, that the brain doesn’t already do? Might it be epiphenomenal, just along for the ride? And if so, is it the unconscious, not consciousness, that’s in control?  I aim to show how we might defuse or parry 3 threats to autonomy: mechanism, epiphenomenalism and unconscious influences.

best,
Tom

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Stanley Klein <[e-mail]>
to Iras <[e-mail]>
April 1, 2012

Tom and Ted and others,

What about the following approach  for laying this problem to rest so that we don't waste more time on it. Why don't we simply acknowledge that there are four sorts of common responses to the qualia problem, each held by respectable philosophers, neuroscientists and others:
 
1)  Qualia (why brain activity produces subjective feels) will someday be understood by science.
2) Qualia will never be understood by science, because subjectivity isn't part of science.
3) Qualia isn't even a legitimate category.
4) It is too early to distinguish between the above three alternatives.
 
The notion of qualia being epiphenomenal is in category 2.
As you may recall from from having run in circles around this topic in previous years, I agree with Crick & Koch in most of the time supporting #4. My 2nd favorite is #2, then comes #1 and sometimes I even agree with Ted and Dennett with #3.
 
Tom, I have two standard questions for you.
1) Which is your favorite category of the four?
2)  How do you deal with the zombie question? Do you think it is impossible to ever build an embodied robot, with brains built out of silicon neurons, that doesn't have subjective feelings?
 
yours in running around this barn again, again,
Stan